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HOW SME UNIQUENESS AFFECTS CAPITAL STRUCTURE: 






The principal aim of this paper is to test how firm characteristics affect Small and 
Medium Enterprise (SME) capital structure. We carry out an empirical analysis over a panel 
data of 6482 non–financial Spanish SMEs along the five-year period 1994–1998, modelling 
the leverage ratio as a function of firm specific attributes hypothesized by capital structure 
theory. Our results suggest that non–debt tax shields and profitability are both negatively 
related to SME leverage, while size, growth options and asset structure influence positively 
on SME capital structure; they also confirm a maturity matching behaviour in this firm group. 
Keywords: Financing, Capital Structure, Trade – Off Theory, Pecking Order Theory, 
SME, Panel Data. 




El principal objetivo de este trabajo reside en estudiar cómo determinadas 
características empresariales afectan a la estructura de capital de la Pequeña y Mediana 
Empresa (PYME). Para lograr este objetivo, se lleva a cabo un análisis empírico sobre un 
panel de 6482 PYMEs no financieras españolas a lo largo del lustro 1994–1998. El ratio de 
endeudamiento se contempla como una función de aquellos atributos específicos de las 
empresas que han sido identificados por la teoría de la estructura de capital. Los resultados 
obtenidos sugieren que, tanto los escudos fiscales alternativos a la deuda como la rentabilidad 
empresarial, se encuentran negativamente relacionados con el endeudamiento de las PYMEs, 
mientras que el tamaño, las oportunidades de crecimiento y la estructura de los activos 
influyen de forma positiva en la estructura de capital de las PYMEs. Estos resultados también 
confirman un comportamiento tendente a la conciliación de vencimientos de activos y pasivos 
en este grupo empresarial. 
Palabras clave: Financiación, estructura de capital, “Trade-off Theory”, “Pecking 
Order Theory”, PYME, Panel de Datos. 1. Introduction 
It is generally accepted that small and medium enterprises, hereinafter SMEs, 
represent a vast portion of the firm tissue of almost every developed country. In this 
respect, the Sixth Report about European companies carried out by the European 
Commission (2000), reveals that the total number of firms existing in the European 
Union in 1998 mounted up to 19,370,000, from which 99.8% were considered SMEs. 
Moreover, these SMEs provided approximately around 66% of European employment 
and 65% of European companies’ turnover. The records for Spain are in line with the 
European ones: there were 2,591,318 SMEs (99.8% of total firms) in 2000, carrying out 
79.8% of Spanish employment and 62% of Spanish firm’s total sales (DGPYME, 2002). 
All these figures show the great importance of this category of firms, but not always 
receiving the joust attention that they really deserve. In words of Zingales (2000, p. 
1629): “Empirically, the emphasis on large companies has led us to ignore (or study 
less than necessary) the rest of the universe: the young and small firms, who do not 
have access to public markets”. 
One of the areas of financial economy that has worried much to academicians 
and professionals is debt policy decisions in companies. Although there are many 
previous empirical studies about financing decisions of large and listed companies
1, the 
scientific community has only started to pay attention to the small firm sector much 
more recently. 
In spite of this, we now have available a considerable number of empirical 
works worldwide like Van der Wijst (1989), Walker (1989a,b), Holmes and Kent 
(1991), Norton (1991), Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993), Chittenden et al. (1996), 
Hamilton and Fox (1998), Jordan et al. (1998), Michaelas et al. (1999), Wagenvoort and 
Hurst (1999) and Hall et al. (2000), and also for the Spanish context like Ocaña et al. 
(1994), Maroto (1996), Boedo and Calvo (1997), López and Romero (1997), Selva y 
Giner (1999), López and Aybar (2000), Aybar et al. (2001), Cardone and Cazorla 
(2001) and Melle (2001). 
                                                 
1 For example, Bradley et al. (1984), Friend and Hasbrouck (1988), Titman and Wessels (1988), Mato (1990), 
Barclay et al. (1995), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham (1996), Saá–Requejo (1996), Estrada y Vallés (1998), 
Shyam – Sunder and Myers (1999),Hovakimian et al. (2001), Miguel and Pindado (2001) and Fama and French 
(2002).  
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Following this line of research, we aim to obtain the main determinants of debt 
policy decisions in small firms. In doing so, we will explain how firm characteristics 
affect Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) capital structure. To achieve this goal we 
use a panel data methodology controlling for individual heterogeneity, economic 
activity and time effects, and a more complete and bigger sample than the foregoing 
studies. 
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 studies how 
the existing capital structure theories can be used to explain the financing decisions in 
the small business sector and at the same time we present the empirical hypotheses 
extracted from the theoretical background that will be tested over a Spanish small and 
medium enterprise sample. Section 3 explains in detail all the variables used in the 
study; besides it describes how we have constructed the firm sample. The model 
employed as well as the econometric techniques that we have applied, are discussed in 
section 4. Also in this section we show the empirical results of the study with their 
implications. Finally, we conclude in section 5 where we also include some proposals 
for the future line of research in this area. 
2. Theoretical  discussion and empirical hypotheses 
The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) set up the basis for the 
development of a theoretical body around the firm capital structure issue. Its main 
proposition establishes that the valuation of a company will be independent from its 
financial structure. As this conclusion is absolutely true under the assumptions 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) took into account
2, the enlargement of the theory onwards 
has been produced relaxing these fundamental assumptions, also with the aim of 
approximating the theory to the firm reality. From this point of view, we can categorize 
capital structure theory under different stances, depending on which economic aspect 
and firm characteristic we focus on. 
The conventional analysis of capital structure states that firms determine their 
leverage level trading off the benefits against the shortcomings that provides debt 
employment (Scott, 1976; Bradley et al, 1984). Under this line of reasoning, emerges 
                                                 
2 Namely, perfect capital markets, no taxes, and absence of agency and transactions costs.  
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the so–called Trade–Off Theory (TOT), which includes fiscal, financial distress and 
interest conflicts issues. 
Concerning the fiscal approach of the TOT, Modigliani and Miller corrected 
their original paper in 1963 concluding that firms would prefer debt to other financing 
resources due to the tax deductibility of interest payments. Therefore, our first TOT 
hypothesis will be: “The effective tax rate should be positively related with debt” (H1). 
Some authors like Pettit and Singer (1985) have pointed out that this fiscal 
approach can not be applied into the small firm context, because SMEs are less likely to 
be profitable and therefore to use debt in order to get tax shields. Following this line of 
reasoning the foregoing hypothesis could be established as “there should not exist any 
relation between debt and taxes in SMEs”
3 (H1bis). 
On the other hand, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show that there are other 
alternative tax shields such as depreciation, research and development expenses, 
investment deductions, etc., that could substitute the fiscal role of debt. Therefore, our 
second fiscal approach hypothesis will be: “Non–debt tax shields ought to be negatively 
related to leverage” (H2). 
From a financial distress perspective, Warner (1977), Ang et al. (1982) and Pettit 
and Singer (1985) state that larger firms tend to be more diversified and fail less often, 
so size can be an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy
4. Likewise, small 
companies usually have bigger bankruptcy costs in relative terms. Under these 
assertions, we can construct our third Trade–Off Theory hypothesis in the following 
manner: “Firm size should be positively related to debt level” (H3). 
Agency theory investigates the conflicts of interests between the various 
financial stakeholders of the firm. Basically, this theory considers the conflicts of 
interest brought about, on the one hand, between shareholders and debt holders and, on 
the other hand, between shareholders and managers. SMEs are not likely to suffer from 
this second problem due to the fact that their property identifies almost exactly with 
their management and thereby there will only be a unique financial objective for these 
two groups. Notwithstanding, the agency conflict between shareholder–owners and 
                                                 
3 Graham (1996) found a positive relation between firm size and taxes, which implies that SMEs have lower tax rates. 
4 Note however, as Rajan and Zingales (1995) state, that size may also be a proxy for the information outside 
investors have, which should increase their preference for equity relative to debt.  
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financiers may be particularly severe for small companies, increasing both the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems (Van der Wijst, 1989; Ang, 1992). 
Following Myers (1977), the under-investment problem becomes more intense 
in companies with more growth opportunities, and this fact will take creditors to reduce 
their supply of funds to this type of firms. One of the possible solutions to mitigate this 
problem could be the employment of short-term debt by the firm. In theory, and 
according to Myers´ assertion, there should be a negative relationship between debt and 
growth opportunities; however some authors like Michaelas et al. (1999) have 
propounded a positive relationship between these two variables because SMEs mainly 
use short term debt financing. In line with this last proposition, our fourth TOT 
hypothesis is: “Growth opportunities ought to be positively related with firm leverage” 
(H4). Nevertheless, this hypothesis could be decomposed into: (i) “Long term debt 
should be negatively related to growth opportunities” (H4-a), and (ii) “Short term debt 
should have a positive relationship with growth opportunities
5” (H4-b). 
The restriction of maturity length in credit offered by lenders may explain 
partially debt structure in SMEs. In this sense, small firms may use less long-term debt, 
but probably more short-term debt, than larger firms. This may suggest, following 
Bevan and Danbolt (2000b) and Hall et al. (2000), these next relationships in form of 
our fifth TOT double hypothesis: (i) “Long term debt should be positively related to 
firm size” (H5-a), and (ii) “Short term debt should have a negative relationship with 
firm size” (H5-b). 
The existence of debt agency costs like risk shifting, and potential problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard, may induce creditors to require guarantees to their 
lending, materialized in collateral assets (Myers, 1977; Scott, 1977, Harris and Raviv, 
1990). This kind of assets will retain value in case of a potential liquidation of the firm, 
and could be sold in the market to face the firm’s payment commitments. We formulate 
our sixth and last Trade–Off theory hypothesis in the following terms: “The firm 
leverage ratio should relate positively to asset tangibility” (H6). 
Myer’s (1977) debt overhang problem deals with the fact that firm managers 
may pass up profitable investments (NPV>0) if these projects were to benefit 
                                                 
5 According to Barclay and Smith (1999), when firms with high growth opportunities use debt financing, they will 
prefer short term debt or debt with few restrictive covenants instead of long term debt, in order to maintain their 
financial flexibility.  
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exclusively creditors. In fact, company owners will try to take up those investments that 
generate short-term cash flows (managers myopia); however financiers will only be 
willing to lend resources at a larger kind of seniority, as for example short-term debt. 
According to this view and to the maturity matching principle from Brealey and Myers 
(2000), the preceding hypothesis H6 could be enlarged in the following sense: “If firms 
aim to match maturities of assets and liabilities, we should observe a positive 
relationship between fixed assets ratio and long term debt ratio, while it would be 
negative if leverage ratio were short term” (H6-a). 
Last but not least, if we consider the existence of informational asymmetries 
between investors and managers, two additional capital structure theories appear: the 
Signaling Theory and the Pecking Order Theory (POT). The former theory is of almost 
no use for the small firm sector as SMEs are not usually listed in stock exchange 
markets, and therefore their managers do not intend to signal something to the market 
and investors, while adopting their financing decisions. On the contrary, the latter 
theory could be very useful for our purposes. 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that it exists a hierarchy in the 
financing funds of companies. Due to informational asymmetries, firms will prefer 
internal to external capital sources. This suggests that high profitable companies will 
tend to finance investments with retained earnings rather than using debt. It is worthy 
stressing that this way of firm financing could easily be applied to SMEs through the 
following reasoning: SMEs managers, that are usually at the same time shareholders of 
this companies, do not like to lose their property and control over these firms (Holmes 
and Kent, 1991; Hamilton and Fox, 1998), and therefore the acceptance of new 
shareholders will be almost insignificant, preferring internal financing to external 
resources to finance firm activity
6. In case SMEs needed external funds, they would 
choose debt that does not reduce managers´ operability, that is, short-term debt that is 
not likely to include restrictive covenants. Under this last theoretical stance, we propose 
these two hypotheses: (i) “There should be a negative relation between leverage and 
firm profitability” (H7), and (ii) “SMEs employ predominantly short term debt as debt 
financing” (H8). 
                                                 
6 In his revised version of the pecking order theory applied to SMEs, Ang (1991) establishes that the second financing 
resource for SMEs, after retained profits, will be funds supplied by the present firm shareholders.  
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3.  Description of data source and variables 
3.1. Data  source 
A key question in all SMEs literature is the definition of what is really 
considered as a small business. Every author, in most of the cases, has defined this sort 
of business quite differently. For instance, Van der Wijst (1989) considers small and 
medium–sized business as privately held firms with 1–9 and 10–99 people employed, 
respectively; Ocaña et al. (1994) investigate firms with less than 50 employees (small) 
and firms with employees between 50 and 200 (medium); Boedo and Calvo (1997) 
work with firms that have a 2.4–3.6 million € turnover; Jordan et al (1998) define SMEs 
as firms with less than 100 employees and less than 15 million € turnover; Michaelas et 
al. (1999) consider small independent private limited companies with less than 200 
employees; López and Aybar (2000) analyse companies with sales below 15 million €; 
and Aybar et al. (2001) contemplate firms with sales under 2.4 million € (small) and 
firms with sales between 2.4 million € and 15 million € (medium). This fact suggests 
that there is not a general consensus over what a small business is. 
Instead of taking any of the previous criterions, we have adopted the European 
Commission SME definition
7 
   companies with less than 250 employees, 
   sales below 40 millions €, 
   total assets under 27 millions €, 
   independent privately held
8. 
The sample of SMEs considered in our study has been extracted from SABE 
(Sistema de Análisis de Balances Españoles), which is a database that contains 
economic and financial information with up to eight years of history over more than 
                                                 
7 Recommendation 96/280/EC, April 3, 1996. 
8 These firms can not belong to a big company or to a group of companies.  
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190,000 Spanish firms
9. SABE is managed by Informa, S.A. and is supposed to include 
more than 95% of the companies from the 17 Spanish autonomous communities that 
deposit their financial statements at the Mercantile Registry Offices, with more than 
601,000 € turnover or more than 10 employees. Their sources of information are the 
Mercantile Registry Offices, Official Bulletins (like BORME) and Chambers of 
Commerce, among others. 
Specifically, we have selected those firms from this database that meet the 
following requirements: (i) less than 250 employees; (ii) less than 40 million € turnover; 
(iii) less than 27 million € total assets; (iv) positive equity resources (shareholders´ 
equity) and also positive net income over the whole period of study; and (v) not 
included in a bankruptcy process. The data set has been restricted to observations that 
embody all the essential variables available, and also these variables have a complete 
record over the period of examination. 
The definitive number of firms that makes up our sample amounts to 6482, for 
which we have accounting data for the five year period time 1994–1998
10, resulting in a 
32410 observations balanced panel data. It should be noted that our firm data panel is 
much more complete that the ones that have been used in previous studies, and enjoys a 
greater number of observations
11. 
The vast majority of empirical studies about firm capital structure usually 
consider companies from mixed industries. However, almost all of them regularly 
exclude from their analysis firms belonging to the insurance and financial industry 
because of their specific financial behavior and particular nature
12. Moreover, if we 
                                                 
9 Nowadays, this database is called SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos) as it has extended its 
firm coverage in 2002 (32
nd version) including about 18,000 Portuguese firms. 
10 As the SABE database was created in 1992, its firsts two years of performance are not very complete in terms of 
firm data, so we preferred to begin our study from 1994 onwards in order to use a greater quantity and better quality 
information. 
11 For instance, López and Aybar (2000) consider only 445 SMEs with 1 year (1995) of observations and although 
Michaelas et al. (1999) analyze about 3500 SMEs over a 10 year period, they do not have at their disposal firm 
information for the whole period of time, taking into account less than 2000 companies for some of the years of 
study. 
12 See, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham (1996), Shyam – Sunder and Myers (1999), Bevan and 




attempt to analyze the financing decision in SME, it would be nonsense to include the 
cited industries in our study. 
Firm distribution by industries of our sample and the specific weight of each 
firm sector over the total sample is shown in table 1. 
Table 1: Firm distribution by industries and specific weights 
Industry  Number of firms  % of total firms 
Agriculture, forestry and mining  139  2.14 
Manufacturing 2053  31.67 
Construction 667  10.29 
Wholesale and retail trade  2630  40.57 
Hotels and restaurants  153  2.36 
Transport and communications  237  3.66 
Business services  445  6.87 
Education, health, social work and others  158  2.43 
TOTAL 6482  100 
 
As can be observed, both manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade prevail 
over the rest of industries. 
3.2. Variables 
In each of the empirical hypotheses that we formulated in section 2 an economic 
or financial aspect of the firm was taken into account and the question that arises now is 
how to measure these attributes. Capital structure theory does not specify clearly this 
issue, which has taken some researchers like Titman and Wessels (1988) or Harris and 
Raviv (1991) to conclude that the choice of appropriate both dependent and explanatory 
variables is potentially controversial. Nonetheless, previous empirical work can help us 
to define objectively the proxy variables needed to take on our study. 
The variable that we intend to explain is SME capital structure, which we 
measure by total debt ratio (TDR):  Total Debt
Total Assets
. But as argued by Van de Wijst and 
Thurik (1993), Chittenden et al. (1996), Barclay and Smith (1999) and Bevan and  
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Danbolt (2000a), any analysis of leverage determinants based only on total liabilities 
may screen the important differences between long–term and short–term debt. 
Consequently, in order to shed some light over this question and to get a better 
understanding of capital structure and its determinants, we also consider the following 
two measures of leverage: (i) Long term debt ratio (LDR)  Long-Term Debt
Total Assets
, and (ii) Short 
term debt ratio (SDR): Short-Term Debt
Total Assets
. 
As far as explanatory variables is concerned, we have selected several proxies 
that have been most used in the empirical literature. 
   Effective Tax Rate (ETR):  Taxes
EAIBT+Depreciation
, where EAIBT denotes 
Earnings after interest and before taxes, and Depreciation is taken as a 
flow variable. 
   Non–Debt Tax Shields (NDTS):  Depreciation
Total Assets
, where Depreciation is 
taken as a flow variable. 
   Growth Opportunities (GO):  Intangible Assets
Total Assets
; investment rate of the 
previous period. 
   Asset Structure (AS):  Tangible Assets
Total Assets
. 
   Size (S): natural logarithm of total assets. 
   Profitability (P):  EBIT
ROA=
Total Assets
, where EBIT denotes Earnings before 
Interest and Taxes. 
A preliminary study of our data sample provides us with the main descriptive 
statistics of both dependent and explanatory variables that we collect in table 2. 
A quick review to table 2 displays several matters. In first place, total liabilities 
on average amount to about 61% of total assets value. If we split total liabilities into 
fixed liabilities (repayable in more than one year) and current liabilities (repayable in 
less than one year), the figures 9% and 52% respectively, show that debt financing for 
SMEs in our sample corresponds mainly to a short-term nature, exactly 85%. Note, that, 
initially, this fact is consistent with our empirical hypothesis H8.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
TDR  32410 0.6141  0.2286  0  0.9988 
LDR  32410 0.0895  0.1337  0  0.9665 
SDR  32410 0.5245  0.2293  0  0.9988 
ETR  32410 0.1831  0.1068  0  0.8232 
NDTS  32410 0.0353  0.0364  0  1.2236 
GO  32410 0.0347  0.0722  0  0.9386 
AS  32410 0.4404  0.2392  0  1 
S  32410 13.8989  1.1848  8.1682  17.1111 
P  32410 0.0962  0.0884  -1.0258  3.5468 
TDR: Total Debt Ratio. LDR: Long-Term Debt Ratio. SDR: Short-Term Debt Ratio. ETR: 
Effective Tax 
Rate. NDTS: Non – Debt Tax Shields. GO: Growth Opportunities. AS: Asset Structure. S: Size. 
P: Profitability. 
 
The average effective tax rate of Spanish SMEs is about 18%, which is clearly 
lower than the general tax rate that moves between 30% and 35% in Spanish fiscal 
system, depending basically on the economic situation of companies. With respect to 
asset structure, we find that intangible assets represent over 3% of total assets value, 
whereas fixed assets represent about 44% of total assets. The mean of the natural 
logarithm of total assets over the period 1994–1998 indicates that the average size of 
SMEs was approximately 1,086,965 € in terms of assets, ranging from a 3527 € 
minimum value to a 26,993,320 € maximum value. As far as profitability is concerned, 
the average return on assets over the period of study mounts up to almost 10%, finding a 
great disparity between firms, with a –103% minimum value to a 355% maximum 
value. 
To examine the possible degree of collinearity among variables, we have 




Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 TDR  LDR  SDR  ETR  NDTS  GO AS  S  P 
TDR  1           
LDR  0.2868  1          
SDR  0.8295  -0.2971  1         
ETR  -0.1834 -0.2279 -0.0500  1           
NDTS -0.1179 0.1492 -0.2945 -0.3901  1         
GO 0.0970  0.2763  -0.0644  -0.1539  0.2803  1       
AS  0.0466 0.2497 -0.0991 -0.2239 0.0986 -0.1637  1     
S  -0.1326 0.0458 -0.1588 0.0927 -0.0490 -0.0256 0.0278  1   
P  -0.1676 -0.0386 -0.1445 0.2694  0.0467  0.0341 -0.1311  -0.0403  1 
 
 
As we observe in table 3, the correlation coefficients are not sufficiently large to 
cause collinearity problems in the regressions. 
4. Econometric  methodology and empirical results 
The panel character of our data allows us to use a panel data methodology for 
our empirical research. As Baltagi (1995) states this type of analysis presents clear 
advantages over cross sectional or time series studies. For instance, it can control for 
firm heterogeneity, and reduce collinearity among the variables that are contemplated 
(Arellano and Bover, 1990). Likewise, this technique enables us to eliminate the 
potential biases in the resulting estimates due to correlation between unobservable 
individual effects and the explanatory variables included in the study. Our panel data 
model may be represented as follows: 
it it i it y= X β++ u η ′ ⋅  
where  it y  is the dependent variable,  it X  is a 6 32410 ×  vector that contains all the 
explanatory variables, β  is also a 6 32410 ×  vector with the variable coefficients that we 
pretend to estimate,  i η  denotes the unobservable individual specific effect that is time– 
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invariant
13, and  it u  is the random error, with i denoting firms (cross–section dimension) 
ranging from 1 to 6482 and t denoting years (time–series dimension) ranging from 1 to 
5. 
A critical question in cross section models is to identify whether the 
unobservable individual effects are fixed or random, that is if these effects are 
orthogonal or not to the exogenous variables considered. Usually, the individual effects 
are correlated with the independent variables, and as Mato (1990) asserts, this generates 
biases in the least squares estimators. Notwithstanding, one of the main advantages of 
panel data models, as the one we employ in this work, is that they give us the possibility 
to eliminate the cited biases (Baltagi, 1995). 
To verify the character of the individual effects, it is usually employed the 
Hausman´s (1978) specification test over the null hypothesis that the individual effects 
are not correlated with the independent variables [H0: Cov ( ii t ,X η ) =0]. If we accept the 
null hypothesis, the individual effects are supposed to be random and we will have to 
apply Generalized Least Squares (GLS) to our model with instrumental variable 
estimators. However, if we find that H0 is false, the individual effects are fixed and the 
GLS estimator becomes biased and inconsistent. In this latter case we will have to 
transform our original model, subtracting the average of the variables from it: 





























This new model is called the withingroup transformation, and we can use 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate its parameters, which will provide unbiased 
estimators. 
The outcome of the Hausman´s specification test in our study
15 enables us to 
reject the hypothesis regarding the absence of correlation between the individual 
                                                 
13 In our study we could associate to this effect the unobservable entrepreneurial or managerial skills of the firm’s 
executives. 
14 Note that the key question in this transformation is that  ii = η η , and therefore  ii (-) = 0 η η . 
15 The test statistics for the model with TDR, LTD and STD as dependent variables are 1873.10, 698.61, and 677.64, 
respectively. All these statistics are asymptotically 
2 χ  distributed with 6 degrees of freedom, and have a p-value of 
0.0000.  
  15
unobservable effects and the explanatory variables and, thereby, the choice should be 
the fixed effects and the within transformation model. It should be pointed out that some 
authors, like Michaelas et al. (1999) have based their fixed–random choice upon a more 
intuitive reasoning, rejecting one of the options only whether the sample was supposed 
to represent the whole economy of a country. However, there is no economical or 
econometrical reason to consider a priori one of the cited effects. Therefore, if we do 
not apply this testing methodology we could lose statistical efficiency in the estimation 
stage. 
Once we carry out the regression analysis, we find the following empirical 
results that are reported in table 4. 
Table 4: Regression results 
  TDR  LTD  STD 
Constant  0.053 (2.41)*  -0.519 (25.62)**  0.572 (22.05)** 
ETR  -0.114 (13.95)**  -0.098 (13.05)**  -0.016 (1.68) 
NDTS  -0.681 (24.61)**  -0.252 (9.92)**  -0.429 (13.20)** 
S  0.044 (27.75)**  0.041 (28.63)**  0.002 (1.27) 
GO  0.135 (10.90)**  0.435 (38.30)**  -0.300 (20.63)** 
AS  0.022 (4.44)**  0.114 (24.59)**  -0.091 (15.42)** 
P  -0.154 (17.22)**  -0.034 (4.09)**  -0.121 (11.47)** 
R–squared 
F (p-value) 










Absolute value of t–statistics in parentheses; * denotes statistically significant at 5% and ** 
significant at 1%. 
 
A general outlook to the results illustrates that almost all the correlations 
between variables are highly statistically significant (the exceptions are ETR and S with 
STD); besides the F joint test underlines the need of considering all the variables from a 
statistical viewpoint. 
The two proxy variables that have to do with the fiscal approach of the Trade–
Off Theory (TOT) show mixed evidence. On the one hand, the effective tax rate appears 
to have a significant negative relation with firm leverage, which indicates that H1 is  
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rejected. One of the possible explanations of the sign of this effect could be reverse 
causation between taxes and the firm leverage variable. In this case, companies with 
more debt level would pay lesser taxes. But perhaps, alternatively, SMEs managers do 
not try to reduce their fiscal commitment through debt, because they employ other 
devices to achieve this goal like the ones included in H2. 
Michaelas et al. (1999) obtain this same sign in the relation, although theirs turn 
out to be not statistically significant to a 5% confidence level. Jordan et al (1998) also 
find a negative relationship, explained by the fact that taxes influence debt only due to 
the effect over retained earnings. 
On the other hand, alternative tax shields seem to be negatively related with 
debt. This fact provides empirical support for H2, which is obviously accepted, and 
shows evidence for the controversial DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) hypothesis in the 
small firm sector. 
As revealed in table 4, size is positively related to debt, which suggests that this 
variable determines firm leverage not only for larger firms but also among SMEs. H3 is 
thus accepted. Regarding the decompositional analysis of debt, we observe positive 
relationships between size and both long-term debt and short-term debt, although in this 
latter case not statistically significant. Larger firms seem to employ more debt 
independently of its expiration, perhaps because they can hold a greater bargaining 
power towards creditors. Consequently, hypothesis 5-a is accepted but hypothesis 5-b is 
rejected
16. 
SMEs with more growth opportunities include more debt in their capital 
structures, which takes us to accept H4
17. Nevertheless, a significant negative 
correlation appears between the ratio of intangible assets over total assets and short-term 
debt, which may evidence the different time nature of this sort of assets and liabilities, 
taking us to reject H4-a and H4-b. 
                                                 
16 Bevan and Danbolt (2000b) get similar results, and they only accept our hypothesis 5-b for bank debt. 
17 Michaelas et al. (1999) and Aybar et al. (2001), obtain a significant positive relationship between growth 




As was hypothesized, we find that asset structure is positively related to firm 
total leverage and so we accept hypothesis 6. Remember that SMEs are more likely to 
suffer from moral hazard and adverse selection problems; therefore the collateral value 
of their assets could help to reduce this sort of problems. 
As can be seen from table 4, the relationship between leverage and asset 
structure changes significantly depending on the type of leverage ratio it is used. 
Specifically, we find that long-term debt ratio is positively correlated with asset 
structure, while this correlation becomes negative if we consider short-term debt ratio. 
The same result is obtained by Van der Wijst (1989), Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993), 
Chittenden et al. (1996), and Hall et al. (2000). 
The asset structure variable measures the ratio of tangible to total assets, made 
up mainly by fixed assets that tend to be long term in nature. The negative correlation 
between asset structure and short-term debt ratio means that short-term debt (current 
liabilities) is used to finance non–fixed assets, consisting basically current assets. These 
results confirm the so–called maturity matching principle, and take us to accept H6-a. 
Finally, the negative coefficient on profitability implies evidence for the Pecking 
Order Theory, where more profitable SMEs tend to use lesser debt when financing their 
activity. Hypothesis 7 is accepted and SMEs prefer internal resources to external ones as 
mode of financing. 
5. Conclusions 
Some researchers have pointed out that financial policy in SMEs can be 
explained by the most known capital structure theories. In order to shed some light over 
this question and to get a more thorough understanding of the underlying forces that 
drive capital structure decisions in the SME sector, in this paper we have tested some 
empirical hypotheses, based on different financing decision approaches, over a panel of 
6482 non financial Spanish SMEs during 1994–1998. 
We both confirm some prior findings using an alternative more complete data 
set and extend the analysis using additional firm characteristics such as non–debt tax 
shields, and a decompositional analysis of firm leverage.  
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In the first place, we find leverage to be significantly negatively related to 
alternative tax shields like depreciation, which may seem to confirm DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) theory when applied it to SMEs. Contrary to expectations, we observe 
that taxes are negatively related to debt. Perhaps, this may be due to the fact that higher 
corporate tax rates would result in lower internal funds as well as higher cost of capital. 
Hence, fixed capital formation and demand for external funds would decrease, implying 
an inverse relationship between the level of debt and the effective tax rate. 
Secondly, size and asset structure are both positively correlated with firm debt 
level, as stated by the theory. However, regarding asset structure we obtain a positive 
correlation with long-term debt level but negative with short-term debt level. This may 
evidence the maturity matching principle in SMEs, where they try to finance their fixed 
assets with long term debt, and their current assets with short term debt.  
Thirdly, SMEs with more growth options seem to employ more debt, although 
this relationship becomes negative with short-term debt. This fact may suggest that 
these kinds of assets are linked to a long-term nature, and thus their financing should 
match it. 
Finally, predictions of Pecking Order Theory seems to explain relatively well 
debt policy in SMEs, although the underlying justification of this theory in our case may 
resemble manager’s propensity to not losing part of their control in the firm. Put another 
way, SMEs rely their financing on internal resources instead of turning to outside the 
firm. 
Regarding to future lines of research on SMEs capital structure, the study will 
improve considering a broader time period analysis in order to elucidate whether capital 
structure in this sort of companies changes along different economic cycles. 
Furthermore, taking a dynamical look to the issue and formulating dynamic models of 
debt policy with instrumental variables could enrich the analysis.  
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